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Abstract 
The study sought to examine the relationship between supplier development and 
export performance of oil-seed agro processing firms in Uganda. Specific objectives were to 
examine the structure of supplier development activities, to establish the relationship between 
supplier development activities and export performance, the relationship between supplier 
development and opportunism, and the relationship between opportunism and export 
performance of agro-processing firms in Uganda. A cross sectional quantitative survey 
approach was adopted to undertake the study. A field study using proportionate stratified 
approach was used, involving a sample size of 50. Analysis of data involved the use of 
statistical package for social sciences (SPSS).The findings of the study revealed a significant 
and positive relationship between supplier development and export performance. The 
findings revealed no significant relationship between supplier development activities and 
opportunism and it revealed that opportunism is significantly and negatively related to export 
performance.  
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Introduction 
 Exports are of immense importance to the development of a country in terms of 
economic and societal prosperity especially in developing countries (Westhead, 2008 and 
Koksal, 2008). In fact, firms have begun to consider export activities as prerequisites for 
future growth, profitability and even survival (Mavrogiannis, Bourlakis & Ness, 
2008).Uganda’s export performance is consistent with that of most African countries 
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(UNIDO report, 2006), and between the periods of 1980 to 2007, Africa as a whole lost half 
of its world export market share (UNCTAD, 2008). By the year 2006, Uganda’s percentage 
growth of exports in volume was negative four (-4) in all industries (International Trade 
Center, 2006). In a bid to improve export performance, concessionary schemes like The 
Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Everything But Arms (EBA) provided 
beneficiary countries including Uganda with opportunities to improve their trade position.  
 Supply related constraints appear often on the top as export performance impediments 
in Africa. Common among is the unreliable domestic supply of raw materials, delays and 
poor quality materials and high transaction costs (Fugazza, 2004; Tesfom and Lutz, 
2006;UNCTAD, 2008). Agro-processing firms are constantly looking for avenues to reduce 
costs in order to become competitive and the reduction of transaction costs through supplier 
development has been identified with great optimism (Hobbs, 1996; Muller and Seuring, 
2007; Ryu et al. 2008; Wei and Chen, 2008;.  Most  firms fail to supply their target market 
because their suppliers fail to provide them with inputs that they depend on in their Agro-
processing processes In relation to unreliable supply is the problem of delayed supply (Ryu, 
Min and Zushi, 2008). It consequently forces manufacturers to hold large inventories of 
inputs, tying up funds that could have been used for investment. (Fafchamps, Gunning and 
Oostendorp, 2000) 
 Firms have to work through suppliers to facilitate and realize reliable supply or inputs 
as well as significant cost savings and can no longer limit such efforts to their firm 
boundaries (Stephan, 2005). According to Krause and Ellram, (1997) supplier development is 
defined as; any effort of a buying firm with a supplier to increase its performance and/or 
Capabilities and meet the buying firm’s short and/or long-term supply needs. Effective 
supplier development sustain reliable input supply, improved product quality and reduced 
cost for a buying firm’s products and services in the same way (Amelia and Hale,2007). 
Suppliers’ capabilities and performance contribute greatly to the survival and competence of 
processing firms, given that external spending by these firms account for about 60 or even 70 
percent of the budget (Carr, Kaynak, Hartley and Ross, 2008; Tao, Li and El-Ansary, 2008; 
Wagner, 2006).   
Problem Statement  
 Whereas the contribution of processed oil-seeds to the Ugandan economy has sharply 
increased (66 % growth between 2007 and 2008), their share in the African and World 
market still remains insignificant, 1.8% and 0.52 % respectively (Trade Map, 2009). 
Uganda’s low contribution could be attributed to the poor supplier development and failure to 
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manage opportunistic behaviour of suppliers. Although the various forms of support extended 
to suppliers by firms are relatively well researched; there is still limited empirical evidence on 
the relationship between the different forms of supplier development and the export 
performance of firms in the Agro-processing sector 
Research Objectives  
(i)  To examine the structure of Supplier Development Activities  
(ii)  To establish the relationship between Supplier Development Activities and 
Export Performance.   
(iii) To determine the relationship between Supplier Development Activities and 
Opportunism.  
(iii) To determine the relationship between Opportunism, and Export Performance 
of Agro-Processing firms in Uganda.  
Literature Review 
The structure of Supplier Development Activities  
 The ultimate objective of providing training to suppliers is to improve suppliers 
quality, flexibility, delivery performance and to reduce transactions cost, by training them 
how to constantly improve their operations (Amelia, Carr, Kaynak, Hartely and Ross 2008; 
Sharon,2007). Wagner (2006) asserts that seeking, building and maintaining relationships 
with suppliers forms a basis and foundation for competition and survival of firms in the 
globally competitive market place. Firms can realize significant cost saving by reducing 
external spending which account for 60 or even 70 percent of the budget of many firms.  
 According to Watts and Hahn, (1993, p.12) supplier development is defined as: 
“A long-term cooperative effort between a buying form and its suppliers 
to Upgrade the  supplier’s technical quality, delivery and cost capability 
and foster Ongoing improvements” 
 Whereas from a transaction cost perspective (Williamson, 1985), supplier 
development refers to a transaction specific investment by the buying firms. Hartely and 
Jones (1997) define supplier development as the practice of working with suppliers to 
improve their performance and increase their capabilities.  
 Supplier development was pioneered in the automotive industry. Companies such as 
Toyota and Honda are masters at supplier development initiatives (Liker and Wu, 2000). 
They have long since recognized that the supply chain is only as strong as its weakest link 
and therefore invest time and money into developing suppliers’ skills and capabilities. In a 
long-term sourcing relationship, Japanese companies, in particular, are known to send a large 
number of Japanese engineers and technical support staff to train local suppliers not only to 
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meet the rigorous Japanese product quality standard but also to improve on their production 
and delivery capabilities.  
 Uganda being a predominantly agricultural country, most of the supplier development 
initiatives and practices are manifested in form on contract farming. In Uganda, contract 
farming has been traditionally restricted to plantation crops (sugarcane and tea) where out-
growers have been supplementing production of large processing agribusiness firms to ensure 
a continuous supply of critical inputs (UPTOP,2007).  
 According to Joy and Larry (2008), the components of supplier development include; 
coordination, cooperation, commitment, information sharing and feedback. However, 
Supplier development can be distinguished by the role the buying firm plays, i.e. according to 
the resources committed to a specific supplier. In the case of “direct” (Monczka et al., 1993) 
or “internalized” (Krause et al., 2000) supplier development, the buying firm plays an active 
role and dedicates human and/or capital resources to a specific supplier. Direct supplier 
development includes activities such as on-site consultation, education and training programs, 
temporary personnel transfer, inviting the supplier’s personnel, as well as the provision of 
equipment or capital (Wagner, 2006). According to Joy and Larry (2008), the components of 
supplier development include; coordination, cooperation, commitment, information sharing 
and feedback 
 Contrariwise, the buying firm commits no or only limited resources to a specific 
supplier in case of “indirect” (Monczka et al., 1993) or “externalized” (Krause et al., 2000) 
supplier development. Instead, the firm offers incentives or enforces supplier improvement, 
and hence makes use of the external market to encourage performance improvements. This is 
frequently done by assessing suppliers, communicating supplier evaluation results and 
performance goals, increasing a supplier’s performance goals, instilling competition by the 
use of multiple sources or promising future business (Krause, 1997; Krause et al., 2000; 
Monczka et al., 1993; Prahinski and Benton, 2004). 
 However, supplier development activities can be categorized based on the level of 
firm involvement and implementation complexity.  The impetus for this categorization stems 
from its potential to link development activities and their impact on performance. These 
include: basic, moderate, and advanced supplier Development practices (Sanchez-Rodriguez, 
Hemsworth, Martinez-Lorente, 2005).Basic supplier development construct pertains to those 
supplier development practices that require the most limited firm involvement and minimum 
investment of the company’s resources (i.e. personnel, time, and capital) and thus, are likely 
to be implemented first in an effort to improve supplier performance and/or capabilities. 
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These supplier development practices include evaluating supplier performance, providing 
feedback about the results of its evaluation (Sanchez-Rodriguez et al, 2005) 
 The moderate supplier development construct involves by moderate levels of buyer 
involvement and implementation complexity, therefore requiring comparatively more 
company resources (personnel, time, and capital) than basic supplier development practices. 
The supplier development activities considered to have moderate levels of involvement and 
implementation complexity include visiting suppliers’ plants to assess their processes 
(Krause, 1997), reward and recognition of supplier’s achievements in quality improvement 
(Trent and Monczka, 1999), and supplier certification (Krause, 1997; Trent and Monczka, 
1999). The advanced supplier development construct pertains to those supplier development 
practices characterized by high levels of implementation complexity and buyer involvement 
with suppliers, therefore, requiring a greater use of company resources (personnel, time, and 
capital) than moderate and basic supplier development.  
 Supplier development can be distinguished by the role the buying firm’s plays, i.e. 
according to the resources committed to a specific supplier. In the case of “direct” (Monczka 
et al, 1993) or “internalized” (Krause et al, 2000) supplier development, the buying firm 
plays an active role and dedicates human and/ or capital resources to a specific supplier. From 
a transaction cost perspective, direct supplier development refers to transaction-specific 
investment by the buying firm (Williamson, 1985, 1991). Direct supplier development 
includes activities such as on-site consultation, education and training programs, temporary 
personnel transfer, inviting the suppliers’ personnel, as well as the provision of equipment or 
capital Krause et al, 2000).  
 Beverly and Ulf, (2005) assert that it is imperative to invest time and money into 
developing suppliers’ skills and capabilities, since the supply chain is only as strong as its 
weakest link.. Therefore, it’s fundamental that buying firm must get involved in the training 
and education in order to address the skills gaps. This view is supported by Joy and Larry 
(2008) who affirm that successful buyer-supplier relationships require the supervision of 
suppliers, the development of their technical capabilities and sharing information intensively 
but selectively.  
Supplier Development Activities and Export Performance   
 Majority of firms engaged in International business in the era of globalization are 
forced to support their suppliers simply because they cannot afford to have any of their 
suppliers under perform. Such under performance sequentially affects the performance of the 
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buying firm. Therefore, firms have started re-examining their suppliers in a long-term 
perspective (Verwall and Donkers, 2001) 
 Numerous agro-processing firms in developing countries have underutilized the 
liberalization of markets in developed countries, despite the reduction in non-tariff barriers. 
In most cases, this is attributed to failure to produce products to required specifications, most 
importantly unsustainable supply. In most cases, these firms are only able to meet the first 
half a dozen orders, and gradually default on the subsequent orders. The blames for such 
inefficiencies is in most cases attributed to the buyers’ suppliers. The buyers’ suppliers are 
usually blamed delayed delivery and delivery of substandard inputs. (Piercy, Katsikeas and 
Cravens, 1997) 
 According to Larson (2004), delayed, unreliable and poor quality inputs are very 
expensive to the processing firm. He notes that 25% of is devoted to repair of defects and 
errors and sourcing for alternative suppliers of inputs. Consequently, manufacturers hold 
large inventories of inputs, tying up funds that could have been used for investment 
(Fafchamps, Gunning and Oostendorp, 2000). 
 Mihalis (2008) found out that despite the fact that firms in the UK assign great 
importance to the role their suppliers play to the sustainability and competence of their firms, 
their involvement in the activities of the suppliers is relatively low. On the contrary, Kristian, 
Torben and Rhona, (2008) have a divergent view by asserting that there has been a dramatic 
shift in recent years by firms moving from a transactional to a relational-oriented approach to 
dealing with their suppliers.Bevery and Ulf (2005) assert that its imperative to invest time 
and money into developing suppliers’ skills and capabilities, since the supply chain is only as 
strong as its weakest link.. Therefore, it’s fundamental that buying firm must get involved in 
the training and education in order to address the skills gaps. This view is supported by Joy 
and Larry (2008) who affirm that successful buyer-supplier relationships require the 
supervision of suppliers, the development of their technical capabilities and sharing 
information intensively but selectively.  
 On the contrary, Lambert and Knemeyer (2004) believe that good results can be 
achieved without investing extra effort to form a tight relationship with every supplier. In fact 
Tan et al (2002) find no relationship between supply chain information sharing and various 
measures of performance. This view is further strengthen by Vereeeke and Mulle (2006) who 
only find a weak relationship between buyer -supplier collaboration and performance 
improvement.  Joy and Larry (2008), find that, although feedback between the buyer and 
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supplier positively influences the buyer-supplier relationship, feedback between the two 
parties does not positively impact the supplier’s performance.  
 Effective supplier development sustain reliable input supply, improved product 
quality and reduced cost for a buying firm’s products and services in the same way (Amelia 
and Hale ,2007). Suppliers’ capabilities and performance contribute greatly to the survival 
and competence of processing firms, given that external spending by these firms account for 
about 60 or even 70 percent of the budget (Carr, Kaynak, Hartley and Ross, 2008; Liu, Tao, 
Li and El-Ansary, 2008; Wagner, 2006).   
Supplier Development Activities and Opportunism 
 Williamson (1975) defines opportunism in general terms as “self-interest seeking with 
guile”. What sets opportunism apart from the standard economic assumption of self-interest-
seeking behaviour is the notion of guile. Williamson (1985), in his later work describes guile 
as “lying, stealing, cheating and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or 
otherwise confuse. He further notes that opportunism can manifest itself both as a deliberate 
misrepresentation of various kinds during relationship initiation (i.e. ex ante) and various 
forms of violations over the course of the relationship (i.e. ex post).  John (1984) notes that 
opportunism does not include other forms of self-interest seeking, for instance, hard 
bargaining, intense and frequent disagreement and similar conflict behaviors do not constitute 
opportunism. 
 Wathne and Heide (2000) categorize opportunism as either active or passive. They 
stress that opportunism may occur when a party either engages in or refrains from particular 
actions.  For instance passive opportunism takes the form of shirking or evasion of 
obligations and active opportunism involves one party engaging in behaviors that were 
explicitly or implicitly prohibited.  
 Williamson (1975) divided opportunism into blatant or strong-form opportunism and 
lawful opportunism. He states that blatant opportunism may manifest itself through deliberate 
misrepresentation of various kinds during the relationship initiation (ex ante) and various 
forms of violations over the course of the relationship (ex post). Williamson (1960) asserts 
that failure to disclose ones true attributes results into a problem of adverse selection. Blatant 
opportunism may also manifest itself in the form of evasion of obligations in the ongoing 
relationship.  
 Williamson (1991) uses the term lawful opportunism to describe violations that do not 
pertain to a formal contract. Typically a scenario whereby a lack of contractual detail enables 
a party to exploit loopholes either passively, by evading informally stated obligations or 
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actively, by taking advantage of a lack of formality in a contract. Williamson (1979) also 
asserts that the risk is greater if the number of alternative suppliers is limited. The smaller the 
number of suppliers available to the buyer, the greater the chances that they could act 
opportunistically and later the terms of the contract to their own advantage.  
 Wathne and Heide (2000), assert that whereas opportunistic behaviour can take place 
under any circumstance, certain conditions facilitate the flourishing of opportunistic 
behaviour. They include: lock-in conditions and conditions manifesting information 
asymmetry regarding a party’s attributes or actions, thus the ability for one party to detect 
opportunism is limited. Consequently, this gives the exchange partner the opportunity to 
pursue opportunistic actions without being caught.Grzekowiak and Al-Khatib (2008) state 
that the goal of maximizing profits ( or utility) may lead to opportunistic behaviour in 
occasions that allow the extraction on unilateral gains at the expense of another for instance 
by misrepresenting information. They link Machiavellian motives to opportunistic 
tendencies. They assert that exchange partners that follow Machiavellian ideas to evaluate 
their actions are likely to find it appropriate to use any means to accomplish organisation 
goals including manipulation and deceit. 
 According to Das (2005), the objective of deceitful behaviour by a partner firm is to 
seek gain for self interest at the expense of the other party. Withholding or distorting 
information and shirking or failing to fulfill promises or obligations are examples of deceitful 
behaviour.  It’s widely recognized that all partners have potential for deceitful behaviour to 
some degree; however, the tendencies for deceit may be latent or dormant. Most member 
refrain from behaving deceitfully for fear that they may be found out resulting into loss or 
reputation or possible contractual termination.  
 Given that it’s often impossible to identify who is likely to act opportunistically, low 
confidence levels arising from deceitful behaviour not only discourage the formation of buyer 
–supplier relationships Das (2005). However, Chin Ting, Nan Chen and Bartholomew (2007) 
believe that making information more transparent between buyers and suppliers in a such a 
way that each side can know about the other sides information lessens incidences of 
uncertainty and would consequently reduce opportunism. 
 The concept of mutual hostages Das (2005), mitigate or lessens the effects of 
opportunism despite intensive supplier development efforts. The notion suggests the 
exchange of critical resources between buyers and suppliers, such that each member firm 
becomes vulnerable to potential losses, thereby materially demonstrating credible 
commitment to each other. Unless parties make similar amounts of transaction-specific 
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investments, there would be a strong incentive for parties making less transaction specific 
investments to behave deceitfully.  
 The same view about mutual hostages is maintained by Hwang and Burgers (1997) by 
asserting that transaction specific investments provide credible commitment that reinforces 
mutual assurance thereby reducing incidences of opportunistic behaviour.  Due to 
vulnerability on both sides, a partner will hesitate to engage in deceitful or opportunistic 
behaviour for fear of losing its own critical resources held hostage by the presumptive 
“victim” firm.  
 On the contrary, they also assert that if the gain from opportunistic or deceitful 
behaviour is greater than the loss of the hostage resources, a partner will persist with deceitful 
behaviour even in the presence of strict monitoring mechanisms. This is evident among 
suppliers of primary raw materials who are known to sell to other processors or buyers who 
offer a slightly better price, despite arrangements with processors or buyers who supplied 
them with inputs (supplier development activities).   
 Supplier development initiatives with stronger emphasis on monitoring the 
beneficiaries (suppliers) can restrict the opportunistic tendencies Das (2005). Monitoring 
suggests close, first hand supervision of activities of suppliers. The idea is to discourage the 
suppliers from becoming deceitful.However Wathne and Heide (2000) slightly contradict the 
above view asserting that excessive monitoring efforts may jeopardize mutual trust building 
efforts because monitoring requires close scrutiny which often detracts from trusting 
behaviour. They suggest that monitoring should be done as unobtrusively as possible. The 
buying firms can monitor the behavior of the supplying firms in a random fashion to ensure 
that the suppliers will always be on guard about engaging in opportunistic behaviour.  
 Johnson, Cullen and Sakano (1996) believe that supplier development activities that 
emphasize participatory decision making yields better results in shrinking the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour.  They assert that shared decision making has positive consequences 
in that it inhibits opportunistic tendencies. The same view is echo by Sexton (1997). He 
asserts that the close interaction made through shared decision making signify both a 
commitment to and interest in the outcomes which consequently decrease the perceived 
likelihood of opportunistic behaviour and mostly importantly, the possibility that the 
likelihood of opportunistic behaviour will be recognized. This method is responsive to 
potential conflicts and facilitates goal congruence.  
 Das and Teng (2001) suggest another view calling for supplier development activities 
that empathizes training.  They assert that training serve to regulate and standardize 
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behaviour of the supplier and the buyer.  They believe that training enables both parties to 
impress certain behavioral norms on the relationship. They accept as true, the notion that 
through training, a buyer can persuade the staff is his supplier to behave in an appropriate 
manner and therefore less opportunistically.  
 Through proper training, the buying firm can attempt to inculcate the norm of full 
disclosure of information and thus the value of being open with critical information of 
relevance to the partner. Training can also deter various types of distortion and deceitful 
behaviour.  However training should include the development of skills to detect possible 
deceitful tendencies and possibilities Das (2005).Wathne and Heide (2000) assert that the 
occurrence of opportunistic behaviour has important implications in that if the risk of 
opportunism is a particular relationship is sufficiently high, considerable resources must be 
spent on control and monitoring, resources that could have been deployed more productively 
for other purposes. This view is shared by Calfee and Rubin (1993) who stress that the risk of 
opportunism may produce substantial opportunity costs in the form of “valuable deals that 
won’t be done”. Among suppliers, the category of opportunism that is more prevalent is in 
the form of quality shirking. This means that a supplier is withholding efforts or passively 
failing to honor an agreement.  
 Williamson (1975) recognizes that businesses and individuals will sometimes seek to 
exploit a situation to their own advantage. This risk is greater when there exists a small 
numbers bargaining problem, For example, the fewer the number of alternative suppliers 
available to a buyer, the more likely it is that an existing supplier will act opportunistically to 
alter the terms of the business relationship to their own advantage, such as by demanding a 
higher price than that previously agreed. This consequently determines the volume or 
quantity of inputs that a buyer can purchase and thus affecting the export volumes he can 
manufacture.  
Opportunism and Export Performance of Agro-Processing firms 
 Abdel-latif and Nugent (1995) assert that in a world without transaction costs like 
opportunistic behaviour but with perfect markets, the penetration of international markets 
would be a simple matter of production cost. Yet, despite remarkable technological 
improvements relevant to the costs of international transacting, and considerable relaxation of 
exchange controls .the costs of international transactions are generally far from negligible. In 
particular, from around the world there is growing evidence that reforms designed to provide 
the right economic environment for the local production of exportable products and 
incentives for exporting are insufficient in themselves to generate rapid export growth.  
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 According to Rupert Loader (1997), Transaction cost analysis recognizes that many 
business exchanges are characterized by incomplete, imperfect or asymmetrical information. 
Information incompleteness Informational asymmetries can lead to opportunistic behaviour 
in two ways. The first involves ex ante opportunism where information is hidden prior to a 
transaction. This is ex post opportunism which occurs after a transaction because of the 
hidden actions of individuals or firms (Hobbs, 1996). These parties may have the incentive to 
act opportunistically to increase their economic welfare because their actions are not directly 
observable by other parties.  
 The ever increasing competition in the global market place implies that firms that fail 
to keep up with the demand of their buyers, for instance, timely delivery to specifications, 
will quickly be replaced with firms that are much better at reducing their buyers’ transaction 
costs especially those that can be avoided like costs of deceitful behaviour. The emergence of 
global value chains have manifested the need for firms to increase their support to suppliers 
in an attempt to reduce risks of delayed delivery resulting from opportunism. They have 
released that their entire survival depends of the inputs from their suppliers. In this light, they 
have decided to give the necessary support to firms that are engaged the provision of inputs to 
the buying firms (Ruben, Boselie and Lu, 2007) 
 Major retail stores engage in the supply of fresh organic products have subsequently 
been forced to support and develop their suppliers and a control mechanism against the 
ineffectiveness and inefficiencies in the supply of vital inputs in the  to their departmental 
stores . (Kneller, Pisu and Yu, 2006) 
 Larson (2004) points out that most manufacturers aim at reducing costs of inputs, 
improving quality of inputs and having consistent and timely delivery of inputs. Suppliers’ 
capabilities and performance contribute greatly to the survival and competence of agro-
processing firms, given that external spending by these firms account for about 60 or even 70 
percent of the budget (Carr, Kaynak, Hartley and Ross, 2008; Liu, Tao, Li and El-Ansary, 
2008; Wagner, 2006).   
Methodology 
 The study was a cross-sectional, quantitative survey. Supplier development and export 
performance of Agro Processing firms was captured using quantitative measurement scales, 
while elements of opportunism cost were captured using quantitative measurement scales.   
 The population for the study was Oil Seed- Agro processing firms in Uganda which 
are 56 in total (source: Uganda Oil-Seed Agro Processors Association). Using proportionate 
stratified sampling approach, a sample of 50 was drawn from a total population of 56. 
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(Krejcie and Morgan, 1970)  A random sampling approach was used to select respondents 
from the individual strata and stratification was done according to size. 
Table I: Sample size of the study 
Category  Population Percentage 
Population 
Sample 
size 
Proportionate 
Sample Size 
Large scale 5 8.93% 4 (5/56)50 = 4 
Medium  scale 13 23.21% 12 (13/56)50 = 12 
Small scale 38 67.86% 34 (40/56)50 = 34 
Total 56 100% 50                 50 
Source: Uganda Oilseed Producers and Processors Association, 2009 
 
Categorization criteria based on production capacity 
Small scale:    1 metric tonne to 10 metric tonnes  
Medium scale:   10metric tonnes to 49metric tonnes 
Large scale:   50 metric tonnes and above 
 The study relied on primary sources of data. Primary data was collected from 
respondents using a structured semi-standard questionnaires and personal interviews. 
Secondary data was got from the Uganda export promotion board and the Uganda Investment 
Authority The questionnaire consisted mainly of closed ended questions and open-ended 
questions all in line with the study objectives. The questionnaires were self-administered for 
clarity purposes and seek respondents’ opinions. A pre-coded structured semi-standardized 
questionnaire built on a Likert scale with responses ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) was used to get the quantifiable data from individual respondents.   
 Supplier Development Activities were be measured using items adapted from 
previous research by Kruase & Ellram, 1996 and Sanchez-Rodriguez, Hemsworth, Martinez-
lorente, 2005. Carr, Kaynak, Hartley & Ross, 2008.Opportunism was measured using items 
adapted from Hobbs, 1996, loader, 1997 and Macher & Barak D. Richman, 2008.Export 
Performance was measured using items adapted from Domiguez & Zinn, 1994, Madsen, 
1989 and Carlos, 2004.The questionnaire was pre-tested before its final administration. The 
Cronbach coefficient was used to assess the reliability of the measures. Nunnally (1967) 
states that reliability coefficients of 0.70 or more are considered good.  . The items adopted 
have been used overtime and have been proven to be valid. The interview guide was designed 
before the administration and pre-administration sessions were carried out to test its 
reliability.  
 The results in the table were generated so as to assess the levels of reliability of the 
research instrument. The internal consistency reliability was assessed using the Cronbach 
alpha values while the Validity was assessed using the Comtent Validity Index (CVI). 
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Table: I 
Variable  Anchor Cronbach Alpha CVI 
Supplier Development 5 point 0.931 0.737 
Opportunism 5 point 0.841 0.650 
Export Performance 5 point 0.727 0.833 
 
The results in the table above showed that the measures were both reliable and valid 
since the Cronbach alphas and CVI values were above 0.6. 
Results And Discussions  
 The results showed that the majority of the organizations were registered limited 
companies (96.7%) and the rest of the organizations were categorized under partnerships 
(3.3%). Only five organizations that had registered as limited companies had been in 
existence for at least 10 years (17.2%).  The chi-square test results showed that there is no 
association between the period for which an organization has been operating and the type of 
organization (sig. >.05).  This implies that the status of an organization will not necessarily 
mean it will operate for a longer or shorter period of time.  
 The results showed that the majority of companies had at least between 1-30 external 
suppliers of products and services (75.9%), with the minority of companies (24.1%) having 
between 31-50 external suppliers of products and services. The organizations under a 
partnership organizational arrangement only had external suppliers of products and services 
within the range of 1-30. No association was observed for the type of organization and the 
number of external suppliers of products and services (sig. > .05). This implies that whether 
an institution is partnership or a company, this will not necessarily determine the number of 
external suppliers of products and services.  
 The results showed that the majority of the respondents were in the management 
department (36.8%), this was followed by respondents in other areas of specialization 
(26.3%). The respondents in the finance area of specialization followed suit compromising of 
21.1%. The marketing area of specialization comprised of the least number of respondents 
(15.8%). The majority of the respondents in management positions were under contract terms 
of employment (57.1%). The chi-square test results showed that there is no association 
between the areas of specialization of the respondents and their employment status (sig. 
>.05). This implies that the employment status of the respondents will not necessarily 
determine their areas of specialization.  
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Descriptive of the Variables  
 The scale was anchored such that 1-represents strongly disagree, 2- disagree, 3-
uncertain, 4-agree and 5-strongly agree. Means close to 1 or 2 show disagreement, whereas 
means close to 4 or 5 reflect agreement with the issue at hand.  
Table II: 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Export Performance 1.88 1.05 30 
Investing in personnel 3.17 0.88 30 
Process Oriented advice 3.60 0.73 30 
Evaluation and feedback 3.75 0.72 30 
Intensive information Exchanges 3.90 0.55 30 
Opportunism 3.58 0.42 30 
 
The results showed that the firms were low on export performance (mean = 1.88), 
most of the firms had poor export performance figures. It was noted that investing in 
personnel (mean = 3.17) needed improvement since most firms hardly engaged in investing 
in personnel. Opportunism was prevalent among the transactions of these firms (mean =3.55) 
and this ought to be reduced, for instance through increased monitoring and scrutiny of the 
suppliers activities. Process oriented advice, evaluation and feedback & intensive information 
exchange was low with means of 3.60, 3.75 & 3.90 respectively and therefore needed 
improvement. Except for export performance, all standard deviations were less than 1, 
implying that the mean is a fair representation in the oil seed agro processing sector in 
Uganda. 
Factor Analysis for Supplier Development Activities 
Table: III 
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We provide our suppliers with support of high quality .714    
We provide competent resources for problem solving for 
suppliers 
.692    
We provide resources for problem solving at the right time to 
our suppliers 
.868    
We provide technical support (investment in 
equipment/personnel) to help our key supplier to improve their 
operations 
.665    
We visit suppliers' factories to assess their facilities. .878    
The company provides training to its suppliers. .698    
We provide technical expertise to help fix problems on our 
supplier's production line 
.713    
Our employees work with our key supplier's employees to 
improve their operations 
.834    
Our suppliers participate in training offered by our company .809    
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 Suppliers are recognized and rewarded for material's quality 
improvement. 
 .843   
Our employees evaluate our key supplier's operations and 
provide feedback to help them to improve. 
 .831   
Suppliers participate in the company's new product development 
process. 
 .707   
Suppliers are involved in the buyer's new product design process  .536   
As a result of our association with our supplier, our supplier’s 
delivery time improved. 
  .549  
Suppliers are informed of their performance   .815  
Purchasing collaborates with suppliers in improvement and 
development activities for new raw materials and parts. 
  .854  
There is a procedure for supplier quality qualification.    .652 
Our supplier cannot afford to lose our company’s business    .612 
We provide a cooperative climate between suppliers and buyers 
through intensive information exchanges such as suppliers 
releasing internal information 
   .798 
Eigen Values 8.846 2.22 1.824 1.407 
Cumulative % 46.557 11.685 9.601 7.408 
Variance % 46.557 58.241 67.842 75.25 
  
It was noted that Investing in Personnel, Process Oriented Advice, Evaluation & 
Feedback and intensive information sharing make up variances of 46.557%, 11.685%, 
9.601% and 7.408% respectively. Companies ought to visit their suppliers’ factories to assess 
their facilities (.878) at the same time provide resources for problem solving at the right time 
to their suppliers (.868). firms ought to provide regular training to their suppliers and 
encourage them to participate regularly (.809), coupled to that, company employees ought to 
work with employees of their key suppliers to improve their operations (.834). Suppliers 
ought to be informed of their performance (.815) and firms ought to have purchasing 
collaborations with their suppliers in improvement and development activities for new raw 
materials and parts (.854) it was also noted that firms ought to recognize and reward their 
suppliers for material’s quality improvement (.843) and encourage their employees to 
evaluate their key supplier’s operations while providing feedback to help them improve 
(.831). It was also evident that both buyers and suppliers ought to develop a system of 
intensive information exchanges (.798) 
The Factor Analysis Results for Opportunism 
Table: IV 
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The supplier has tried to deceive us on several occasions .646   
Our supplier gives us wrong information about their goods and services. .592   
The supplier does anything within his means to further his own interests. .644   
Promises made by our suppliers are not all fulfilled. .632   
European Scientific Journal    May 2013 edition vol.9, No.13    ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
484 
 
The supplier lacks integrity when not closely monitored. .709   
Sometimes the supplier slightly alters facts in order to get what he wants. .770   
Sometimes the supplier presents facts in such way that he looks good. .698   
Our suppliers drag us into forced negotiations. .572   
I feel that it is OK to do anything within my means that will help further my 
own interests 
 .848  
Sometimes I have to alter the facts slightly in order to get what I want.  .588  
I have sometimes I have to alter the facts slightly in order to get what I need  .572  
I have sometimes promised to do things without actually doing them later   .547  
Complete honesty does not pay when dealing with my primary supplier  .629  
Sometimes I present facts to my primary supplier in such a way that I look 
good  
  .687 
My primary supplier isn't always truthful with me, so am not always 
completely honest with them  
  .718 
Sometimes I have to exaggerate my needs in order to get what I really need 
from my supplier  
  .523 
Eigen Values  9.153 4.631 2.629 
Variance % 45.763 23.154 13.145 
Cumulative % 45.763 68.917 82.062 
  
It was noted that Duplicity, Fraudulence and Deception comprised of 45.763 %, 
23.154% and 13.145% respectively. It was noted that suppliers lacked integrity in their 
business dealings and felt that they ought to do things in their means to help further their own 
interests (.848). Tendencies to alter facts by suppliers were prevalent (.770). It was noted that 
deception was prevalent among buyers often misrepresenting facts (.687), lacking complete 
honesty (.718) and with tendencies to exaggerate their needs (.523) 
The Factor Analysis Results for Export Performance 
Table: V 
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Over the years, the company has realized average annual growth in export sales .787  
The performance of export sales per country for the company was good. .832  
The ratio of the firm's total annual export sales to the total number of company employees 
was good. 
.781  
The performance of export sales for the company was good. .767  
The performance of export sales for the company has improved by .725  
The company's total annual export sales to total production improved by .899  
The performance of export sales per country for the company was good. .868  
The firm's total annual export sales to the total number of company employees improved 
by 
.674  
Over the years, the company has experienced a decline in the average annual growth in 
export sales 
 .536 
There is difficulty in meeting importers' product quality standards by the exporting firms.  .539 
Overseas markets for company's products are not stable.  .504 
Eigen Values 4.728 1.635 
Variance % 59.100 20.435 
Cumulative % 59.100 79.535 
  
It was noted that the sales trends and growth targets comprised of 59.100% and 
20.435% respectively. On sales trends, it was observed that it is essential that management 
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ensures that the company creates sustainable balance between total production and annual 
export sales (.899), while ensuring  that it exports volumes proportionate to the market sizes 
of their respective export markets (.868). On growth targets, it was noted that firms ought to 
concentrate on regional markets that are much stable compared to overseas markets (.504) 
and firms ought to take a greater initiative in trying to meet the importers’ product quality 
(.539).  
Relationship between the Variables  
Table: VI 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Investing in 
personnel-1 
1.000          
Process Oriented 
advice-2 
.690** 1.000         
Evaluation and 
feedback-3 
.413* .198 1        
Intensive 
information 
Exchanges-4 
.404* .507** .342 1.000       
Supplier 
Development-5 
.666** .924** .143 .359 1.000      
Duplicity -6 -.353 -.115 -
.150 
.314 -.256 1.000     
Fruadulance-7 -.080 .019 -
.100 
.034 -.126 -.341 1.000    
Deception-8 -.427* -.228 .070 -.131 -.311 -.395* -.068 1.000   
Opportunism-9 -.375 -.220 .063 -.062 -.361 -
.602** 
.826** .346 1.000  
Export 
Performance-10 
.684** .445* .097 -.180 .518** .696** -.275 -.291 -
.700** 
1.000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The results showed that most Oil-seed Agro–Processing firms had intensive 
information exchanges with their suppliers (mean=3.98) and in the same light, most of the 
firms also carried out evaluations of their suppliers and provided them with feedback (mean= 
3.75). Process oriented advice was substantially given by most firms (mean=3.60). However, 
most of the firms showed low levels of investing in personnel (mean=3.17). 
 The results in the table above revealed a significant and positive relationship between 
the supplier development initiative components which are investing in personnel (r=.684**, 
p<.05), process oriented advice (r=.445*, p>.05), and Export Performance. Evaluation and 
feedback, intensive information exchanges which are also components of the same variable, 
were not positively related to the dependent variable (p >.05). The composite variable of 
Supplier Development Initiatives was also positively related to the export performance 
(r=.518**, p<.05). 
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 The results showed no significant relationship between supplier development 
activities and opportunism (p >.05). This implies that supplier development activities both 
direct and indirect don’t consequently reduce opportunistic tendencies among suppliers.  
 The results showed that opportunism is significantly and negatively related to export 
performance of the variable (r= -.700**, p<.01). This implies that opportunism has a negative 
effect on the export performance of the exporting firms in Uganda. 
Regression Model  
 The results show the degree to which supplier development and opportunism can 
explain Export performance. The results in the table below showed that supplier development 
and opportunism can explain 49.8% of the variance in export performance (Adjusted R 
square = 0.498). 
Table: VII 
 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Model B Std. Error Beta 
 (Constant) 6.360 2.112  3.011 .010 
 Supplier Development .272 .196 .273 1.389 .188 
 Opportunism -1.519 .493 -.606 -3.080 .009 
 Dependent Variable: Export Performance 
R Square 0.565  F Change 8.438 
Adjusted R Square 0.498  Sig. F Change 0.004 
  
In addition, Opportunism (beta= -.606, Sig<.009) is more influential at explaining 
export performance than supplier development (beta=.273). The regression modal was valid 
(Sig=.004). 
Discussions, Conclusions And Recommendations 
 The results showed that most oil-seed agro-processing firms had substantial amounts 
of intensive information exchanges & feedback and process oriented advice towards their 
suppliers. However, most firms showed low levels of investing in their suppliers’ personnel. 
The results indicated that investing in personnel significantly contribute to supplier 
development. The findings are consistent with Bevery and Ulf (2005) who assert that “it’s 
imperative to invest time and money into developing suppliers’ skills and capabilities, since 
the supply chain is only as strong as its weakest link”.  
 The findings show a significant and positive relationship between supplier 
development activities and export performance of oil-seed agro processing firms. This 
implies that the more oil-seed processing firms undertake supplier development activities, the 
more their export performance will increase. The findings are consistent with Sharon (2007) 
who asserts that supplier development activities encourage openness and flexibility needed to 
achieve a competitive advantage. The findings are also consistent with Wagner (2006) who 
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asserts that seeking, building and maintaining relationships with suppliers forms a basis and 
foundation for competition and survival of firms in the globally competitive market place. 
Firms can realize significant cost saving by reducing external spending which account for 60 
to 70 % of the budget of many firms. However the findings contradict with Lambert and 
Knemeyer (2004) who state that satisfactory performance can be achieved without investing 
extra effort to from a tight relationship with every supplier. In the same light, Vereeke and 
Mulle (2006) found a weak relationship between supplier collaboration and performance. 
 The findings established no significant relationship between supplier development 
activities and opportunism. This implies that supplier development activities both direct and 
indirect don’t consequently reduce opportunistic tendencies among suppliers.The findings are 
consistent with Hwang and Burgers (1997) who assert that if the gain from opportunistic or 
deceitful behaviour is greater than the loss of the business relationship with the buyer, the 
supplier will persist with deceitful behaviour even in the presence of supplier development 
activities like training of suppliers and monitoring of suppliers operations. 
 However, the findings are consistent with Wathne and Heide (2000) who assert that 
supplier development activities like regular monitoring of supplier operations may jeopardize 
mutual trust building efforts because monitoring requires close scrutiny which often detracts 
from trusting behaviour.The findings established that opportunism is significantly and 
negatively related to export performance of the variable. This implies that opportunistic 
behaviour like quality shirking, misrepresenting information and deceitful behaviour like 
promising to deliver on time than doing the contrary has a negative effect on the export 
performance of the exporting firms in Uganda. 
 This supports observation made by Wathne and Heide (2000) who assert that the 
occurrence of opportunistic behaviour has important implications in that if the risk of 
opportunism in a particular relationship is sufficiently high. Considerable resources must be 
spent in control and monitoring resources that could have been deployed more productivity 
for other purposes.The findings are also consistent with Calfee and Rubin (1993) who stress 
that the risk of opportunism may produce substantial opportunity costs in the form of 
“valuable deals that won’t be done”. Among suppliers, the category of opportunism that is 
more prevalent is in the form of quality shirking. This means that a supplier is withholding 
efforts or passively failing to honor an agreement 
Conclusions  
 The study examined the effect of supplier development and export performance of oil-
deed agro processing firms in Uganda. Specifically the study examined the structure of 
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supplier development activities among the oil-seed agro- processing firms, its relationship 
with opportunism and export performance of these oil-seed agro-processing firms. The study 
established a significant positive relationship between supplier development activities and 
export performance; therefore firms in the oil-seed agro processing industry ought to engage 
more in activities that help improve the operations of their suppliers.The study also 
established a significant negative relationship between supplier development activities and 
opportunism. Hence, firms ought to be extra cautious when engaging in any supplier 
development activities. Oil seed agro processing firms ought to be stricter when monitoring 
activities of the supplier’s in order to reduce opportunistic behaviour since it directly has a 
negative effect on their export performance. 
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